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POINT I COUNTERPOINT 
BEARING FALSE WITNESS: THE CUNTON IMPEACHMENT AND 
THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
t 
NEAL DEVINS 
Academic freedom may prove to be one of the casualties of the 
Clinton impeachment.1 By signing letters about the constitutional 
standards governing impeachment, an issue most of them know very 
little about, many academics placed partisanship and self-interest 
above all else. The logic of academic freedom, however, cannot be 
squared with academics who see celebrity and power as more impor-
tant than the pursuit of truth. Grounded in the belief that academics 
searching for knowledge in free universities will strengthen a free so-
ciety, academic freedom insulates the academy from political attack.2 
It also gives credibility to the writings, testimony, court filings, talk 
show appearances, and other activities of academics who seek to influ-
ence public policy. At the least, academic freedom conveys the mes-
sage that scholars who speak out on public issues know something 
about those issues. When academics join forces to send a purely po-
litical message, their reputation as truth-seekers will diminish and, 
with it, their credibility. While that day has not yet arrived, it is rapidly 
approaching. Accusations of political correctness run amok and 
goofiness3 are becoming increasingly mainstream.4 Unless academics 
t Goodrich Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government, College ofWilliant and 
Mary. Special thanks to Mary Sue Backus for her research assistance, counsel, and 
good cheer. Thanks also to John Duffy, Lou Fisher, Mike Fitts, Mike Gerhardt, Mike 
Klamtan,John McGinnis, Alan Meese, Tom Merrill, Bob Nagel, David Rabban, Jeremy 
Rabkin, Suzanna Sherry, and participants at a University of Georgia workshop for their 
help. 
1 Another casualty, of course, is the independent counsel statute, the Ethics in 
Government Act, which expired on June 30, 1999. See David Johnston, Attorney General 
Taking Control as Independent Counsel Law Dies, N.Y. TIMEs, June 30, 1999, at A1 (noting 
that support for the statute eroded because of accusations by both parties that it was 
being used as a "political weapon against incumbents"). 
2 See infra notes 15-19, 83-85 and accompanying text (arguing that society accords 
academics, and perhaps judges, privileges it accords no one else). 
' See Ray Suarez, Too Many in Academe Stayed Grandly Above the Fray, CHRON. OF 
HIGHER Eouc., Mar. 6, 1998, at B8 (saying that in the academy, "[e]very exantple of 
(165) 
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can answer these charges, they risk becoming irrelevant. Conse-
quently, when a significant number of law professors and historians 
hold themselves out as experts when they are not, they mislead, and 
all academics pay a price. For this very reason, academics can ill af-
ford another nail to be placed in the coffin of the dispassionate aca-
demic expert. Rather, they must hold politically motivated professors 
accountable for abusing academic freedom. 
* * 
The practice ofbolsteringa political argument with the help of an 
academic expert was on full display during the Clinton impeachment. 
In explaining why he could not have committed a "high crime and 
misdemeanor," the President asked rhetorically: "[W]hy did nearly 
900 constitutional experts say that they strongly felt that this matter 
was not the subject of impeachment?,s The President, of course, was 
referring to two open letters sent on his behalf-one from 400 histori-
ans; the other from more than 430 law professors.6 
The President was hardly alone in referring to these letters. His 
lawyers entitled a section of their House Judiciary Committee submis-
sion "Recent Statements by Historians and Constitutional Scholars 
Confirm that No Impeachable Offense is Present Here."7 Along the 
same lines, Democrats contended that the "scholarly support for the 
[President] ... is overwhelming, and it cannot be ignored,s while Re-
publicans complained that the letters "substitute[d] political opinion 
for scholarly analysis."9 
A decade earlier, 2,000 legal academics banded together in an-
freaky marginality, youthful goofiness, and faculty softheadedness was defined as the 
norm"). 
4 See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text (calling attention to accusations 
that "political correctness, like-minded thinking, and intolerance have corrupted the 
academic ethic"). 
5 Remarks Prior to a Meeting with Labor Leaders and an Exchange with Reporters, 
35 WEEKLYCOMP. PRES. Doc. 46, 47 (Jan. 13, 1999). 
6 See Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing before the Subcomm. ()11. the Consti-
tuti()11. of the House Comm. ()11. the judiciary, 105th Cong. 334-39, 374-83 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter Hearings] (recording the historians' and law professors' letters). 
7 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Submissi()T/. by Counsel for President 
Clint()11. to the Committee ()11. the judiciary of the United States House of Representatives (Dec. 8, 
1998) <http:/ /www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/L2R?/um:pd::/ /oma.eop.gov.us/ 
1998/12/11/12.text.1>. 
8 145 CONG. REC. S1567 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
9 145 CONG. REc. S294 (daily ed.Jan. 16, 1999) (statement of Rep. Canady). 
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other letter-writing campaign. The subject: Robert Bork. The objec-
tive: to communicate that Bork's thinking was outside the constitu-
tional mainstream. This campaign also hit pay dirt. Finding Judge 
Bork "[o]utside the [t]radition of Supreme Court OJurisprudence," 
the Senate Judiciary Committee Report highlighted this "unprece-
dented" opposition to the nomination.10 
Beyond Bork and impeachment, academics have written joint let-
ters on abortion, affirmative action, bankruptcy reform, campaign fi-
nance, copyright reform, gun control, international human rights, su-
permajority requirements, the nomination of federal court judges, 
and much more.11 Portraying their signatories as "concerned legal 
scholars," "constitutional scholars," "professors of law," and "profes-
sors of bankruptcy and commercial law, "12 these letters are intended to 
communicate the consensus opinion of academic experts.13 While 
these letters have not overtaken expert testimony and individual let-
ters to Congress, letter-writing campaigns have become an increas-
10 SENATE COMM. ON Tim jUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF ROBERT H. BORK TO BE AN 
AssOCIATEjUSilCE OFTIIE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, Exec. Rep. No. 100-7, at 6-
7, 13 (1987). By highlighting the attention these letters received, I am not suggesting 
that academic letter writing changes votes in Congress. Rather, academic letter writing 
provides rhetorical cover to members of Congress who have already made up their 
minds. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing the prominent role 
played by congressional staffers in organizing academic letter-writing campaigns). 
11 See, e.g., Hearings emS. 158 Before the Suhcomm. em Separatiem of PQWers of the Senate 
Comm. em the judiciary, 97th Cong. 255 (1981) (statement of Laurence Tribe) (describ-
ing joint letter writing in opposition to human life legislation as "an unprecedented 
unison of voices"); Constitutional Scholars' Conference, joint Statement, Constitutional 
Scholars' Statement em Affirmative Actiem After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 
YALE LJ. 1711, 1712 (1989) [hereinafter Scholars' Statement] (examining how Crosem 
should affect municipal governments' affirmative action programs throughout the na-
tion); Richard B. Lillich, Introductiem: The Gruwing Importance of Customary International 
Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 23-24 (1995) (discussing the "ubiqui-
tous ... 'Affidavit oflnternational Law Scholars' that has become the norm in recent 
human rights cases"); Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors 
in Opposition to HR 604, HR 2589, and S 505, "The Copyright Term Extension Act" 
(on file with author and the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (available at 
<http:/ /www.public.asu.edu/-dkatjala/letters.html>). See also infra notes 22, 45, 50, 
58 and accompanying text (discussing gun control, supermajority requirements, fed-
eral court nominee Daniel Manion, and campaign finance reform). 
12 See Hearings, supra note 6, at 374 (referring to "professors oflaw"); Scholars' State-
ment, supra note 11, at 1711 (referring to "constitutional scholars"); infra note 63 (not-
ing that the signatories were "concerned legal scholars"); see also Draft Letter to Sena-
tors Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy (referring to "professors of bankruptcy and 
commercial law") (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
1
' The fact that only academics can sign these letters also signals that letter signers 
are speaking as experts, not concerned citizens. For further discussion, see infra notes 
88-91 and accompanying text. 
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ingly important mechanism for academics to send a message to Con-
gress. Why, though, do people pay attention to these letters? Why 
treat these letters with more deference than, say, a petition from the 
ACLU or the NRA? The answer, of course, is that academics have a 
reputation for placing the search for truth ahead of partisanship. Un-
like movie stars, interest groups, or the person on the street, the 
credibility of academics is tied to their purported willingness to speak 
"[t]ruth to [p]ower."14 
Society, acting on this vision, accords academics certain privileges 
that it accords no one else (except perhapsjudges).15 Academic free-
dom, tenure, sabbaticals, and the like encourage academics to think 
independently and to challenge prevailing norms through their 
scholarship.16 At the same time, the trust that society has placed in 
academics, as well as the resources it has provided them, are 
grounded in certain assumptions about academic conduct. Academ-
ics, for example, have an obligation "to speak truthfully about the is-
sue at hand, because they have a detached cast of mind as well as a 
large stock of relevant and reliable knowledge on the subject at is-
sue. "
17 Correspondingly, before speaking as experts, academics have 
' an obligation to read and to think about arguments on both sides of 
an issue. The ways of the scholar, as Alexander Bickel put it, "appeal 
to men's better natures" because they are about the leisure of think-
ing, training, and insulation, not "the moment's hue and cry."18 
Whether or not academics live up to this obligation, Bickel's vision 
still resonates with much of the public.19 For this very reason, policy 
14 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Intellectuals' Role: Truth to Power?, WALL. ST. J., Oct 12, 
1983, at A28. Whether Schlesinger, an organizer of the historian's anti-impeachment 
letter, lived by this creed is another matter. See infra notes 57-60 (referring to instances 
of academics' involvement in political causes). 
15 Like academics, judges have a reputation for dispassionate expertise and can ill 
afford for that reputation to give way to the view that judicial decision-making is simply 
another form of politics. See THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 
199-206 (Yale Univ. Press 1935) (expressing the view that society accepts the judgment 
of judges so long as they think that judges are acting like lawyers-reading law and ap-
plying it-instead of politicians). 
16 See David M. Rabban, Academic Freedom, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 1HE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 12-13 (Leonard W. Levy et a!. eds., 1986) (exploring the theoretical 
underpinnings of academic freedom). For further discussion, see infra notes 70-72 
and accompanying text (arguing that an assumption of dispassionate truth-seeking is 
the "first obligation" of academics). 
17 Edward Shils, The Academic Ethic, in THE CALLING OF EDUCATION 3, 107 (Steven 
Grosby ed., 1997). 
18 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 26 (2d ed. 1986). 
19 In a 1997 Gallup Poll, college teachers were ranked fourth highest for honesty 
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makers and media outlets seek out academics on many of the issues 
that divide the nation. Academic letter-writing campaigns likewise 
capitalize on the academic's reputation for dispassionate expertise. 
Consider, for example, the anti-impeachment letters. Writing "nei-
ther as Democrats nor as Republicans" (but as "professors of law"), 
these citizen scholars saw the drive to impeach the President as a 
threat to "our constitutional order."20 Signed by many of the nation's 
most prominent law professors and historians, it is no wonder that 
these letters were taken seriously by the President's supporters as well 
as his foes. Upon closer inspection, however, these letter-writing 
campaigns are little more than a testament to the willingness of many 
academics to pawn off fake knowledge. 
Of the 900 signers of the anti-impeachmentletters, for example, it 
is doubtful that many had thought seriously about the constitutional 
standards governing impeachment. 21 Impeachment, at least until this 
past year, is a subject that is rarely written about and rarely taught. 22 
Indeed, nearly all of the legal academics who testified before the 
House Judiciary Committee were better known for their allegiance to 
either liberal or conservative causes than for their scholarship about 
impeachment. 23 For this very reason, these academics have been 
and ethics among 26 major occupations. See Leslie McAneny & Lydia Saad, Honesty and 
Ethics Poll, GAlLUP NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 13, 1997 <http:/ /www.gallup.com/poll/ 
releases/pr971213.asp>. 
20 Hearings, supra note 6, at 334, 374. 
21 How many of the letter signers had, in fact, read the 200-page Starr Report is 
another matter altogether. Since the theory of the letter was that whatever had taken 
place was private (even the alleged peljury) and not a threat to the separation of pow-
ers, many letter signers may have found the Starr Report beside the point. It is possi-
ble, however, that some letter signers paid no mind to the letter's reasoning or dis-
agreed with the reasoning. These letter writers may have focused instead on the 
conclusion. For these letter signers, the allegations contained in the Starr Report may 
well have been pivotal. 
22 See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (arguing that there is no reason to 
assume that constitutional scholars necessarily have expertise regarding impeach-
ment). Much the same can be said of the Second Amendment. Nevertheless, through 
postings on a criminal law and a constitutional law list serve, law professors were in-
vited to sign onto a "legal scholar" amicus brief in a recent Second Amendment case. 
For a full discussion of this brief with the author, see Interview with DavidYassky, Assis-
tant Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School (Sept. 8, 1999). See also Legal Scholars 
Debate Second Amendment Case (visited Sept. 7, 1999) <http:/ /abcnews.go.com/wire/us/ 
ap19990907_758.html> (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (discuss-
ing the disagreement among academics about the brief). 
2S Only one witness, Mike Gerhardt, was found acceptable to both Democrats and 
Republicans. Not surprisingly, Republican witnesses testified that the President's con-
duct might well be impeachable. For their part, Democratic witnesses argued that the 
President's conduct could not be impeachable. More telling, many (roughly one-half) 
of the law professor witnesses had not written anything about impeachment before the 
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roundly criticized both for the quality of their constitutional analysis 
and for "conducting a transparently political debate in constitutional 
terms. "24 Far more significant, most of the historians who signed the 
letter were not constitutional specialists.25 Among the law professors, 
only one-third of the signatories teach constitutionallaw.26 
Even among professors of constitutional law, moreover, there is 
no reason to think that these individuals have "some expertise on the 
topic of impeachment.n27 Consider, for example, professors (such as 
myself) who have used Cass Sunstein's constitutional law casebook. 
Just over one page of this 1800-page tome considers the constitutional 
standards governing impeachment. 28 And that one page provides ab-
Clinton scandal. 
24 Michael J. Klann an, Constitutional Fetishism and the Clinton Impeachment Debate, 85 
VA. L. REV. 631, 631 (1999); see also John 0. McGinnis, Impeachable Defenses, POL 'YREv., 
June & July 1999, at 27, 27-29 (criticizing the reasoning and methodology of law pro-
fessors' positions on Clinton's impeachment). It is also noteworthy that scholars who 
argued against the appropriateness of originalism at the Bork hearings made use of 
originalism (and little else) in arguing against the Clinton impeachment. See Philip 
Elman, Shame on the Partisan Professors, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 16, 1998, at 21 (noting this 
reversal of position). 
25 See Jesse Lemisch, Anti-Impeachment Histarians and the Politics of History, CHRON. OF 
HIGHER Eouc., Dec. 4, 1998, at B6 (discussing the advertisement taken out by scholars 
opposing the impeachment of President Clinton). 
26 According to the biographical data contained in the 1998-99 AMERICAN 
AssOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS' DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS, 130 of the 452 signers 
of the law professor letter list constitutional law as among the subjects that they teach. 
For this very reason, the anti-impeachment letter is cut from a different cloth than, say, 
letters on bankruptcy or copyright reform. In those cases, only individuals familiar 
with the letter's subject matter were allowed to sign and, consequently, some mecha-
nism was in place to screen the bona fides ofletter signers. 
27 Cass R. Sunstein, Professors and Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 191 n.6 (1999). Sun-
stein "assume[s]" that anyone who teaches "some aspect of constitutional law as part of 
their curricular responsibilities" has impeachment-related "expertise." !d. Whether or 
not corporations professors who teach about corporate free speech would qualify, Sun-
stein's list of assumed experts certainly includes faculty who teach courses on church 
and state, freedom of speech, or state constitutional law. Sunstein also assumes that, in 
the wake ofWatergate, many law professors "developed genuine, iffairly general, views 
on the appropriate meaning of 'high crimes and misdemeanors.'" !d. at text accom-
panying notes 12-13. But this assumption is implausible. For some law professors (my-
self included), Watergate is a distant prepubescent memory. And for those who do 
remember, there is little reason to think that their undoubtedly "genuine" views meas-
ure up to the standard of expert academic opinion (especially since perjury on a pri-
vate matter was not a critical part of the Watergate drama). See also infra notes 95-96 
and accompanying text (detailing the paucity of impeachment-related expertise). 
28 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 423-24 (3d ed. 1996) (dis-
cussing constitutional standards governing impeachment). As to why so little space is 
given to impeachment: Casebooks focus on case law. The substantive standards gov-
erning impeachment are a nonjusticiable political question and, consequently, there is 
no case law on the subject. 
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solutely no guidance in assessing the appropriateness of the Clinton 
impeachment. 29 Consequently, whether or not the question raised in 
the Clinton impeachment was "close," it is doubtful that professors of 
constitutional law-let alone all law professors-were well positioned 
to render an expert opinion on the subject. 30 
At one level, the lesson here is simple. Many of the law professor 
and historian signatories were animated by partisanship and self-
interest, not scholarship.31 Needless to say, there is a real temptation 
for academics who want to be part of the fray, who want to see their 
names in print, who want to tell their families that they did something 
that mattered, to sign a mass letter. Other academic letter signers may 
not care at all about celebrity. They may, however, care a great deal 
about the President's ability to pursue his agenda. In particular, parti-
san Democrats who voted for the President and support his policies 
may sign the letter for political reasons.32 As it turns out (surprise), 
29 Instead, the focus of this entry is that "there is no clear answer to the central 
question: What is the meaning of the phrase 'high Crimes and Misdemeanors'?" I d. at 
423. More striking, the Teacher's Manual accompanying this casebook asks: "Why has 
the House used the impeachment route so rarely? One might explore the possibility 
that impeachment for quasi-political reasons might be a good idea .... " GEOFFREY R. 
STONE ET AL., TEACHER'S MANuAL TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71 (3d ed. 1996). The 
Sunstein casebook is hardly unique. Some case books do not mention impeachment at 
all. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER ET AI.., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMEs FOR THE 
CONSTITUTION'S T'HIRD CENTURY (2d ed. 1998). Other casebooks dedicate only a page 
or two to the topic. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER & KATin.EEN M. SULLIVAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 411-13 (13th ed. 1997). 
so Sunstein, supra note 27, at text accompanying note 4. For arguments that the 
constitutional question was anything but obvious, see Klarman, supra note 24, at 657-
58, and RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE (1999). See also Symposium, Back-
ground and History of Impeachment, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 601,601 (1999) (Foreword by 
Representative Henry Hyde, Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary) (high-
lighting divergent thinking among "academic experts" on this question). If something 
is truly debatable, moreover, it is especially important that letter signers are truly ex-
perts. Otherwise, there is great risk that their conclusions simply will be a reflection of 
their personal preferences. More significant, the fact that some experts do not think 
the constitutional question is close does not mean that those who are not experts can 
sign on as experts. For further discussion, see infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text 
(arguing that law professors are not experts on all legal issues merely by vinue of their 
status as law professors). 
!J Sunstein recognizes that "[f]or some of the signatories, perhaps this is true." 
Sunstein, supra note 27, at text accompanying notes 12-13. Sunstein does not consider 
the possibility that mass letters may register bias and, consequently, are a poor device 
for communicating scholarly expertise. 
!
2 The fact that the academy's "A" team signed onto these letters made it easier to 
join the chorus. Mter all, if Anhur Schlessinger, Laurence Tribe, and others are will-
ing to put their stamps of approval on these letters, there is reason to think that the 
letter's argument is at least plausible. 
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the academy is overwhelmingly left-liberal, overwhelmingly Demo-
cratic.33 Take the case of the law professors.34 "Only [ten] percent of 
[them] characterize themselves as conservative to some degree/15 
while more than eighty percent of them are registered Democrats.36 
Therefore, many legal academics see Kenneth Starr-who argued 
against abortion rights and affirmative action as the Bush administra-
tion's Solicitor General--as their nemesis. At a panel on impeach-
ment at the 1999 American Association of Law Schools convention, 
for example, law professors loudly booed when it was revealed that 
one of the panelists, John McGinnis, clerked for then-D.C. Circuit 
Judge Starr. For these professors, signing a letter that would place 
Starr's views on impeachment "outside the legal mainstream" would 
be manna from heaven. 
This is not to deny that some letter signers signed on for reasons 
other than partisanship.37 But it simply begs the question to "as-
sum[e]" (as do defenders of the letter-writing campaign) that dispas-
33 A 1989 survey by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 
found that, at research universities, 67% of faculty identify themselves as liberal, and 
17% identify themselves as conservative. See Seymour Martin Lipset, The Sources of Pu-
litical Correctness on American Campuses, in THE IMPERILED ACADEMY 71, 79 (Howard 
Dickman ed., 1993) (arguing that political opinions on American campuses are shift-
ing to the left). In the humanities and social sciences, less than five percent of faculty 
identify themselves as conservative. See RICHARD PIPES, PROPERlY AND FREEDOM 272 
(1999) (discussing political diversity in university faculty). 
34 Historians too have a reputation for left-leaning partisanship. See Thomas 
Haskell & Sanford Levinson, Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: Historians and the 
Sears Case, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1629, 1630 (1988) (describing and analyzing "vilification" 
of award-winning historian Rosalind Rosenberg for providing expert testimony for 
Sears, Roebuck in a sex discrimination lawsuit) . 
.s Deborah jones Merritt, Research and TeachingonLawFaculties: An Empirical Explo-
ration, 73 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 765,780 n.54 (1998). 
ss James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity, Speech to the National Association of 
Scholars (Jan. 5, 1997). More striking, although 14.9% offull-timeworkingwomen are 
Republicans, 0.5% of women law faculty are Republicans. I d. For Pierre Schlag, it is 
"[o]nly because legal scholars speak within a stratified and homogeneous community 
can they present their views as the 'work of reason itself.'" Book Note, Let Us Reason 
Together, 112 HARV. L. REV. 958, 959 (1999) (quoting PIERRE SCHlAG, THE 
ENCHANTMENT OF REAsON 38 (1998)). 
s
7 Of the 452 letter signers, Cass Sunstein identifies three who are "not normally 
characterized as 'left-liberal ... .'" Sunstein, supra note 27, at note 21 and accompany-
ing text. No doubt, there are others (non-left liberals) in addition to these three. I am 
equally confident, however, that the overwhelming majority of signatories are-like the 
academy itself--left-liberal. Furthermore, ' for some letter signers, the anti-
impeachment effort served their self-interest. Specifically, since (mostly liberal) aca-
demics embrace both judicial activism" and "big government," the scholarship and 
advocacy of academics is taken more seriously by Clinton appointees than by Republi-
cans in Congress. 
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sionate expertise animated law professor signatories.38 With no evi-
dence of preexisting expertise on impeachment. and with ample evi-
dence that most law professors are left-liberal Democrats, the possibil-
ity of partisanship seeping into the anti-impeachment campaign is 
anything but remote.39 For this reason, letter organizers cannot rely 
on assumptions; instead, they must explain why it is that letter signers 
were qualified experts. Otherwise, accusations of partisan bias (like 
the one levied in this article) may well stick.40 
For their part, organizers of the letter-writing campaign paid far 
more attention to increasing their ranks than to screening the bona 
fides of letter signers. At my law school, for example, a professor of 
civil procedure (and signer of the letter) sent a faculty-wide e-mail dis-
tributing the letter and explaining how to sign on to it. 41 Through an 
e-mail42 sent to me (and most other professors of constitutional law) 
by Cass Sunstein, I was also invited to sign on to a companion letter. 
Although telling me that "[e]very signature really counts,,4S this invita-
38 This, of course, is what Cass Sunstein does in his response. For Sunstein, we 
should "assume that those with whom we disagree are acting in good faith on the basis 
of evidence that they honestly believe to be sufficient." Sunstein, supra note 27, at text 
accompanying note 24. 
'
9 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussing political views of legal 
academics, including evidence that partisanship may have figured into law professor 
opposition to the Starr Report); infra notes 47, 50 and accompanying text (discussing 
the role played by People for the American Way in both the historians' anti-
impeachment campaign and the law professors' campaign against Bork); infra notes 
63-66 (noting the critical role played by members of Congress in spurring on academic 
letter-writing campaigns). 
~0 And, the easier it is to typecast the academy this way, the more vulnerable the 
academy is to attack. See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text (arguing that 
"[o]ver time, the academic ethic may give way to the view that self-interest and parti-
sanship are the coins of the academic realm"). 
~~ The historian letter-writing campaign used e-mail. The letter's author, Sean 
Wilentz of Princeton, sent the letter to 30 or 40 like-minded historians who then dis-
tributed it to their colleagues. See Mike Feinsilber, 400 Historians, Rodino Resist Im-
peachment, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 29, 1998, at AS (noting that Wileitz e.-mailed 30 or 40 
historians he thought might be dismayed at the implications of an attempt to impeach 
Clinton, and within three days, 300 historians agreed to sign a statement against such 
an attempt). 
42 A not-so-random survey of constitutional law professors suggests that individuals 
disinclined to sign the e-mail were kept off the distribution list. For example, only one 
of the four conservative law professors whom I contacted (Steve Calabresi, John 
McGinnis, Mike Paulsen, and Eugene Volokh) had received the e--mail. Also, Mike 
Gerhardt, an impeachment scholar who refused to take sides, did not receive the e--
mail • 
., E-mail from Cass Sunstein to Neal Devins (Oct. 29, 1998) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review). The text of the letter reads as follows: 
The undersigned professors of law come from different political parties and 
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tion did not contain any analysis to support its one-sentence recom-
mendation. Finally, through a posting on the JURIST web page, the 
organizers of the law professor letter circulated a follow-up letter (that 
any law professor or historian could sign) which called upon the 
President to resist calls for his resignation rather than give in and al-
low his resignation to "fundamentally transform the impeachment de-
vice. ,44 
None of these open letters made expertise a prerequisite for sign-
ing. The reason, of course, was that impeachment was too politically 
charged for a letter signed by, say, twelve leading academics to make a 
difference.45 And making a difference is what letter organizers cared 
most about. Along the same lines, recognizing that their individual 
views on impeachment were of little consequence, letter organizers 
decided that they had to act like an interest group. For this very rea-
son, letter organizers did more than gather names. They worked hard 
at publicizing their efforts. Anti-impeachment historians, for exam-
ple, made effective use of a press conference to release their letter.46 
Also, with the assistance of People for the American Way, the histori-
/d. 
disagree on many political and legal issues; but we agree that the possible 
grounds for impeachment recently identified by Kenneth Starr and David 
Schippers are not an appropriate basis for impeaching a President under Arti-
cle II, section 4 of the Constitution. 
44 Bernard J. Hibbitts, Law Professars Solicit Signatures for Anti-Resignation Letter, (vis-
ited May 21, 1999) <http:/ /wwwjurist.law.pitt.edu/resig.htm> (quoting the letter 
dated Dec. 19, 1998 from Cass Sunstein and Susan Low Bloch to teachers of history 
and constitutional law). 
•s In sharp contrast, some letter campaigns care most about names, not numbers. 
Far from mass mailings, these letters are the province of the academy's glitterati. Some 
of these letters, moreover, are published in law reviews in an effort to shape academic 
opinion. While the signers of these letters are technically coauthors of these publica-
tions, many of them have no involvement in their drafting. Witness, for example, An 
Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, a statement by 17 well known scholars opposed to 
proposed supermajority requirements. See An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 
YALE LJ. 1539 (1995) (urging Congressman Gingrich to reconsider his proposal to 
amend the House Rules to require a three-fifths vote for enactment of laws that in-
. crease income taxes). One of the letter's signers, Jed Rubenfeld, in responding to 
criticisms of (but refusing to defend) the Open Letter, explained that he was a "signa-
tory, but not an author" of the letter. Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in 
Congress, 46 DUKE LJ. 73, 73 (1996). 
46 See John F. Harris, 400 Historians Denounce Impeachment: Case Against Clinton De-
parts From Framers' Intent for Presidency, Letter Argues, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1998, at A4 
(discussing a press conference at which Arthur M. Schlesinger,Jr. and C. Vann Wood-
ward presented an informal coalition of historians who came to Clinton's defense with 
an open letter complaining that successful proceedings against Clinton would leave 
the presidency "permanently disfigured"). 
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ans took out a full page advertisement in The New York Times.47 Minc-
ing no words, the advertisement argued that, if the President were 
convicted, the presidency would be "permanently disfigured" and the 
Constitution "undermine[d]."48 
While organizers of the anti-impeachment campaign made 
greater use of hyperbole and technology than previous lobbying ef-
forts had, they sought inspiration and guidance from the highly suc-
cessful academic campaign against Robert Bork. The anti-Bork cam-
paign revealed what grass roots lobbyists have long known, namely, 
that there is strength in numbers. How better to communicate that 
Robert Bork was outside the constitutional mainstream than for 2,000 
law professors openly to oppose the nomination? At first, organizers 
approached law school deans and professors who had taught constitu-
tional law for five years or more ("except those who were known to be 
supporting Bork"49) to join the anti-Bork campaign. This effort 
proved so successful that it was expanded to all law professors. A con-
tact person at most law schools was identified and that contact person 
solicited signatures from her colleagues. I was contacted this way, as 
were most of my colleagues. 
Partisanship, of course, figured prominently in the campaign 
against Bork. To begin with, the academic campaign was spearheaded 
by Ricki Seidman of People for the American Way and William Taylor 
of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.50 The key to the anti-
Bork letter-writing campaign, however, was the disdain in which the 
legal academy held Bork. Unlike the standards governing impeach-
47 See Nat Hentoff, An Entirely New Impeachment Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1999, at 
A21 (noting that People for American Way assisted Historians in Defense of the Con-
stitution by enabling the list price of the New York Times advertisement to be reduced 
from $75,948 to $56,000). 
49 Historians in Defense of the Constitution, Advertisement, N.Y. nME.s, Oct. 30, 
1998, atA17. 
49 NORMAN VIEIRA & LEONARD GROSS, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS: jUDGE 
BORKAND THE POUTICIZATION OF SENATE CONFIRMATIONS 143-44 (1998). For further 
discussion, see infra note 109 (discussing Sunstein's view that people should only sign 
petitions if they can defend the relevant position publicly but that they need not neces-
sarily defend their positions as academics). 
50 See MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF 
AMERICA'S REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK'S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT 160 
(1992) (noting that Seidman and Taylor led the "effort among the anti-Bork forces to 
recruit academics"). These two had previously coordinated a similar (but unsuccess-
ful) campaign against Daniel Manion, a conservative nominated to the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals. See id. (indicating that, while Seidman and Taylor had "litde trouble 
drumming up opposition" to Manion's nomination in academic circles, Manion's 
nomination was ultimately approved with a one-vote margin). 
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ment, Bork's theories were well known to many academics.51 Never-
theless, it is doubtful that experts in commercial law, evidence, tax, se-
curities, and the like were well versed in Bork's theories. Rather, 
many academics unfamiliar with Bork's writings opposed him because 
of where he would take the Court and because they feared that Bork's 
confirmation would strengthen the then burgeoning Federalist Soci-
ety and, with it, the power of conservatives in the legal academy.52 In 
other words, left-leaning academics saw Bork as a threat to their status 
and influence. In particular, his confirmation would make their 
scholarship and advocacy less relevant because his views did not mesh 
with their own. Bork, moreover, antagonized many legal academics 
during his tour of duty in the Nixon Justice Department, which in-
cluded the firing of Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox and 
the pursuit of Nixon's vendetta against Warren Court liberalism. 53 
Partisan letter-writing campaigns are likely to continue, especially 
among legal academics. Not only are these letters highly visible and 
somewhat influential, but they also allow the rank and file of the 
academy to join forces with the academy's glitterati in a common 
cause. What better way to make oneself part of the "A" team than to 
sign off on the constitutional analysis of Ackerman, Sunstein, Tribe, 
51 For this reason, many of the people who signed letters opposing the nomination 
did so, in part, because they thought Bork's writings were too rigid and too self-
righteous for him to succeed on the Court. An excellent treatment of this subject 
(which does not pass judgment on whether or not Bork should have been confirmed) 
can be found in ROBERT F. NAGEL, jUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICAN CHARACTER 27-43 
(1994), which discusses Bork's relationship with what his critics defined as the main-
stream, and more specifically, how Bork's "critics define the mainstream in terms of 
principle and accuse Bork of standing outside it as a covert practitioner of conservative 
politics through judicial power." /d. at 30. 
52 See GITENSTEIN, supra note 50, at 161 (noting that professors were concerned 
about the possibility of Bork's appointment because they saw him as a symbol of the 
unraveling of the civil rights and civil liberties the Supreme Court had expanded over 
the previous 30 years). For Bork, that battle over his confirmation pitted "left-liberal" 
"intellectual class values" against populists (like him?) who believe in the primacy of 
elections. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 337 (1990) ("The battle 
was ultimately about whether intellectual class values, which are far more egalitarian 
and socially permissive, which is to say left-liberal, than those of the public at large and 
so cannot carry elections, were to continue to be enacted into Jaw by the Supreme 
Court.") (footnote omitted). 
53 For a provocative argument that anti-Bork academics had a moral duty to oppose 
the nomination of Anthony Kennedy (but did not do so because they held a grudge 
against Bork and only Bork), see George Kannar, Citizenship and Scholarship, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2017, 2060-61 (1990) (book review) (arguing that the American public's inter-
est in making fully informed decisions-even wrong ones-required legal scholars who 
had opposed Bork's nomination to take what was a nonconformist stand and publicly 
oppose Kennedy's nomination). 
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and the like? Along these lines, Richard Posner described the law 
professor anti-impeachment letter as "a form of herd behavior (the 
'herd of independent minds') by the animal that likes to see its name 
in print. ,54 The appeal of letter writing, moreover, is fueled by the 
proliferation of media outlets and, with it, the opportunity for many 
academics to achieve their fifteen minutes of fame. Today, academics 
seek fame through talk show appearances, op-ed pieces, and trade 
press books. 55 In this era of sound bite scholarship, it is little wonder 
that being part of the story is far more appealing than writing about it 
some years later. 
In contrast, there is a growing perception among academics that 
court-ordered social reform is a hollow hope. 56 Relatedly, the continu-
ing conservatism of the Supreme Court and of many federal courts of 
appeal suggests that law review scholarship calling for novel judicial 
solutions to social problems will fall on deaf ears.57 Perhaps for this 
54 POSNER, supra note 30, at 242. Some of the letter's signatories, of course, signed 
on because their analysis of both the constitutional standards governing impeachment 
and the Starr Report convinced them that the President's conduct did not warrant re-
moval from office. Many academics did not sign on to the letter because they thought 
it unduly partisan. Nevertheless, judge Posner is correct iri referring to the herd men-
tality of the legal academy. A significant portion of the legal academic community 
signed on to these letters without independent knowledge of the constitutional stan-
dards governing impeachment. See supra notes 20-38 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the possible political motivations and constitutional expertise of academics who 
signed letters about impeaching Clinton). Rather than stand as a roadblock to such 
partisanship, cultural norms within the academy encouraged these letter signers to see 
themselves as an interest group, not as free thinkers committed to the pursuit of truth. 
See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing how letter organizers cared 
only about increasing the number of signatories); infra notes 87-94 and accompanying 
text (discussing the strong incentives of hegemony within the academy). 
55 I agree with Cass Sunstein that none of these things is inappropriate. See Sun-
stein, supra note 27, at text accompanying notes 4-11. Like Sunstein, I also think it is 
perfectly fine for academics (through testimony, letter writing, whatever) to speak as 
experts before Congress. But academics should only speak as experts about matters on 
which they have invested the time and energy necessary to hold themselves out as ex-
perts. See infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text (contrasting Sunstein's definition 
of academic experience from my own). 
56 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOllOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 338 (1991) ("U.S. courts can almost never be effective producers of 
significant social reform. At best, they can second the social reform acts of the other 
branches of government."). 
57 For left-leaning academics, populist constitutional discourse is now preferred to 
Court-centered social policymaking. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CAsE AT A TIME: 
JUDICIAL MINIMAUSM ON TilE SUPREME COURT 3-6 (1999) (identifYing and advocating 
the current Court's 'judicial minimalism"); MARK TusHNET, TAKING TilE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM TilE COURTS 181-82 (1999) (explaining constitutional law 
as a populist narrative and advocating a populist constitutional legal system based on 
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reason, a 1998 report of the Twentieth Century Fund deemed letter-
writing an essential ingredient of its social reform agenda.58 For the 
most part, these campaigns, like the academy itself, advance liberal 
causes.
59 Indeed, conservatives are best off not going head-to-head 
against liberal letter writers. Why gather 100 signatures in support of 
Bork, as did the right of center Ad Hoc Committee for Principled Dis-
cussion of Constitutional Issues?60 A twenty-to-one disparity, rather 
than serve as effective counter-speech, will simply prove an embar-
rassment.61 With that said, right-of-center interests are still likely to 
the Constitution and Declaration oflndependence); Robin West, The Aspirational Con-
stitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 241, 245-46 (1993) (acknowledging that while such a shift is 
unlikely to occur, it would constitute a shift from a judicially-enforced Constitution of 
limits to a congressionally-enforced Constitution of aspirations and would help mod-
ern progressive causes). For conservatives the legal academy has only itself to blame: 
"it has become a heavily normative body of advocacy scholarship targeted at the federal 
courts with the goal of influencing them to do things that they are extremely unlikely 
to do in the current political ap.d social climate." Steven G. Calabresi, The Crisis in Con-
stitutional Theory, 83 VA. L. REv. 24 7, 266 ( 1997) (reviewing LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & 
MARKV. TuSHNET, REMNANTS OF BEUEF (1996) ). 
58 TwENTIETH CENTURY FuND WORKING GROUP ON· CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
LmGATION, BUCKLEY STOPS HERE: LOOSENING THE JUDICIAL STRANGLEHOlD ON 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, 100-01 (1998) (referring to a letter sent by more than 
200 legal academics on campaign finance reform and contending that legal scholars 
could play a critical role in campaign finance reform by signing on to such state-
ments). 
59 Up until now, the most visible letters have all advanced left of center causes: af-
firmative action, abortion rights, international human rights, the defeat of conservative 
judicial nominees, the defeat of supermajority rules, and the defeat of the Clinton im-
peachment. No doubt, as Sunstein argues in his response, the principles enunciated 
in the anti-impeachment letter would apply to a future Republican president. See gen-
erally Sunstein, supra note 27, at note 5 (contending that the academics involved in 
congressional discussions of the possibility of impeaching Clinton were not working 
"for" or "with" the White House). But would Cass Sunstein organize a letter-writing 
campaign to save, say, Ronald Reagan? And if he did, would the same 452 law profes-
sors sign on? SeeSunstein, supra note 27, at note 19 (recognizing that it is possible but 
speculative that personal opinion would affect letter-writing campaigns). 
60 This letter, sent to Senators Robert C. Byrd and Robert Dole, is reprinted in 133 
CONG. REc. S28853 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987). With respect to impeachment, a coali-
tion of 96 academics and former government officials, including Bork, William 
Bennett, and Edwin Meese, wrote to Congress that the Starr Report did, in fact, sup-
port the President's impeachment. See Don't Let the President Lie With Impunity, WAU. 
ST.]., Dec. 10, 1998, at A22 (reprinting a letter signed by academics, lawyers, and for-
mer government officials which was distributed to the House Judiciary Committee and 
urged the House of Representatives to impeach Clinton). Needless to say, my criticism 
of the anti-Bork and anti-impeachment letter-writing campaigns might well apply to 
the pro-Bork and pro-impeachment campaigns. In particular, if signatories signed on 
as non-expert partisans, those signatories (and quite possibly the organizers of these 
campaigns) would have violated the academic ethic. 
61 Indeed, the 100 or so pro-Bork, pro-impeachment letter signers were so out-
numbered that they appeared well outside of the mainstream and, consequently, 
HeinOnline -- 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 179 1999-2000
1999] THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 179 
launch some letter-writing campaigns. Like anti-Bork and anti-
impeachment academics, conservative activists may well seek strength 
in numbers, not academic expertise. For example, in June 1999, a let-
ter opposing proposed gun control legislation was distributed to law 
professors and other academics over e-mail. Recipients of this e-mail 
were told: "If everyone who we are sending this to can get even a 
couple other people in your department to sign th~s, we will end up 
with well over a few hundred signatures."62 It did not matter whether 
possible signatories were well versed in the particulars of proposed 
legislation, in the "real costs" of waiting periods, or anything else. 
Like the anti-Bork and anti-impeachment letters, expertise played 
second fiddle to the bottom line, that is, to sending an effective politi-
cal message. 
* * 
The question remains: Why are these letters taken seriously? 
While it never referred to the lobbying efforts of People for the 
American Way, the NAACP, or pro-choice activists, the Senate Judici-
ary Committee's report on Robert Bork trumpeted the views of legal 
academics. Likewise, the President and his supporters singled out the 
historian and law professor letters. Is the myth of academic expertise 
a drug that somehow blinds policymakers to the partisanship of (at 
least some) academic letter signers? 
Not at all. Politicians and their staffers know full well that the citi-
zen scholars who send these lette~ often have a political ax to grind. 
In fact, rather than being duped by make-believe academic experts, 
elected officials sometimes sponsor these missives! Two years ago, 
Congressman john Conyers's office asked me to join a "community of 
concerned legal scholars" in writing to Congress about intelligence 
spending.63 The draft letter was addressed to none other than Con-
gressman Conyers. Equally striking (and far more significant), Senate 
looked especially politically motivated. 
62 E-mail from john R. Lott,Jr. to James Lindgren (June 3, 1999) (on file with the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
63 Draft Letter to Congressman Conyers, United States House of Representatives 
(June 1997) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). I was asked to sign 
on because a friend suggested my name to Conyers's office. Although Conyers's office 
was coordinating this letter-signing campaign, potential signatories were directed to 
contact the Center for International Policy. I do not know whether the Center for In-
ternational Policy's involvement was a subterfuge, intended to conceal Conyers's in-
volvement. 
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Judiciary Committee chair and Bork foe Joseph Biden asked Chris 
Schroeder, a law professor working for the committee, to help drum 
up law professor opposition to Bork.64 Three other law professors 
working with Biden-Walter Dellinger, Philip Kurland, and Laurence 
Tribe-negotiated with People for the American Way over the text of 
the law professor letter.65 Along the same lines, members of Congress 
were actively involved in at least one of the law professors' anti-
impeachment letters. The invitation to join the ranks of letter signers 
made clear that the letter was consequential because "[s]ome mem-
bers of the House of Representatives have suggested that it would be 
very valuable for the House to hear from a large group of teachers of 
constitutional law on the impeachment issue.',66 
For anti-impeachment House members and anti-Bork Senators, 
academic letters were a kind of salve. Rather than appear overly ideo-
logical and overly partisan, lawmakers can take cover in a letter signed 
by a thousand or more academics.67 In contrast, a letter submitted by 
the AFL-CIO, the National Abortion Rights Action League, or (for 
that matter) the Family Research Council would call attention to, not 
cloak, possible biases.68 In other words, rather than affect the thinking 
"' See GITENS1EIN, supra note 50, at 161 ("Chris Schroeder, at Biden's direction, 
spent much of the late summer and early fall of 1987 on the phone with scores of law 
professors."). 
65 See id. at 161 ("By late August, Seidman had negotiated the text of a letter ac-
ceptable to Kurland, Tribe, and Dellinger, and began to circulate it."). 
66 Sunstein, supra note 43 (quoting one of the letters signed by anti-impeachment 
law professors and sent to Congress). Sunstein never says who these members of Con-
gress are, if he responded to the requests of both Democratic and Republican leader-
ship, or, alternatively, if the letter-writing campaign was the brainchild of one or the 
other side. 
67 Lawmakers likewise can take cover behind academics who testify at hearings. 
These academics often are contacted because they can be counted on to state a posi-
tion that supports the person who invited them to testify, usually the ranking majority 
or minority member of a committee or subcommittee. For example, before I was 
asked to testify about line-item veto legislation, a Senate Judiciary staff member called 
me to confirm that I still subscribed to a position articulated in an article of mine. 
Along the same lines, it was no accident that Republican witnesses at the House im-
peachment hearings testified that the President's conduct was impeachable whereas 
Democratic witnesses testified that it was not. See Hearings, supra note 6 (suggesting 
that the split on whether the President's conduct was impeachable was primarily along 
party lines). 
68 For this very reason, interest group representatives were not called on to testify 
at the Bork confirmation hearings. Rather, "numerous witnesses from the legal acad-
emy presented the Senators with the same critique of Bork that the interest groups 
would have offered, but from a more 'disinterested' perspective .... " Kannar, supra 
note 53, at 2041. See al5o Mary McGrory, The Supreme Sacrifice, WASH. Posr, Oct. 6, 
1987, at A2 (recounting the Democrats' strategy of not calling upon members ofinter-
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of politicians, academic letter-writing enables politicians to offer high-
minded reasons for saying and doing what they othenvise would have 
said and done. Consider, for example, the anti-impeachment letters. 
The votes in the House and the Senate were on largely partisan lines.69 
It simply strains credibility to believe that the law professors' and his-
torians' letters moved fence sitters one or the other way. What these 
letters did do, however, was to enable the President's defenders to tell 
the public that their votes were cast for nonpartisan reasons (the Starr 
Report did not state sufficient grounds for impeachment), not for 
partisan reasons (Democrats need to stick together). 
Here, I think, is where the true significance of these letters lies. 
Politicians feed off of these letters because of the so-called academic 
ethic, that is, the notion that "the first obligation of the university 
teacher is to the truth. "70 Academics, likewise, feed off of this reputa-
tion in justifying these letter-writing campaigns. "We law professors 
are free from a client's interest, free from a place in a hierarchy, free 
to say exactly what we think," explained Barbara Babcock, a former 
Carter Administration justice Department official and signer of both 
the Bork and impeachment letters.71 For Sean Wilentz, principal 
drafter of the historians' letter, "[t]his is not a political effort at 
all. . . . [It is] historians speaking as historians."72 Likewise, Susan 
Bloch and jed Rubenfeld, two of the organizers of the law professors' 
letter, spoke of their efforts as "nonpartisan"73 and of the need for le-
gal academics "to come out of our comfortable law review role to 
ak • n74 m eapomt. 
Letter organizers, whether or not they believe their own rhetoric, 
have no choice but to perpetuate this myth. Othenvise, their missives 
est groups to testify against Bork's confirmation). 
69 See Peter Baker & Helen Dewar, Clinton Acquitted, WASH. Posr, Feb. I3, I999, at 
AI (noting the partisanship present in the vote on the peijury and obslruction of jus-
tice charges); Peter Baker & Juliet Eilperin, Clinton Impeached, WASH. Posr, Dec. 20, 
I998, at AI (noting that vote on the first article of impeachment was "largely along 
party lines"). 
70 SHILS, supra note I7, at 49. 
71 Ronald]. Ostrow &James Gerstenzang, Bork's Shifting Vzews on Law Worry Senaturs, 
L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 26, I987, at AI. 
72 Deb Price, Histflrians Seek an End of Drive to Impeach, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 29, 
I998, atAI2. 
75 InteiView by Kristin Abramson with Professor Susan Bloch, Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center, Law Professurs Send Letter opposing Impeachment: A Conver.ration with Let-
ter Sponsqr Professqr Susan Blcch (visited Nov. 4, I999) <http:/ /wwwJurist.law. 
pitt.edu/bloch.htm>. 
74 Janet Hook, Pro-Impeachment ChflrUS Hopes to Change Tune of Lawmakers, L.A. 
TIMEs, Dec. 9, I998, atA5. 
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would be no different than those of interest groups who wear their 
partisanship on their sleeves. But there is good reason to doubt 
whether academics still think of themselves as truth seekers. In par-
ticular, the traditional image of the academic has given way to "post-
modernism, multiculturalism, and political correctness. "75 Conse-
quently, rather than see these letter-writing campaigns as a departure 
from their scholarly endeavors, many academics increasingly see 
scholarship and partisanship as inextricably linked.76 In this way, the 
willingness of academics (who know next to nothing about impeach-
ment) to sign on to an anti-impeachment letter is understandable. 
For similar reasons, tax and commercial law experts did not blink 
when signing a letter condemningjudge Bark's interpretive theories.77 
Specifically, if non-self-interested knowledge does not exist, it is un-
avoidable that academics will embrace one partisan position or an-
" David M. Rabban, Can Academic Freedmn Survive Postmodemism?, 86 CAL. L. REv. 
1377, 1378 (1998) (reviewing THE FuTuRE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM (Louis Menand ed., 
1996) ). For this very reason, defenders of academic freedom no longer speak of im-
partial scholars discovering objective truths; instead, as Ronald Dworkin puts it, aca-
demic freedom concerns the fundamental ethical "responsibility of [academics] to 
find and tell and teach the truth as they see it." Ronald Dworkin, We Need a New Inter-
pretation of Academic Freedom, in THE FuTuRE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 181, 190 (Louis 
Men and ed., 1996); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedmn and Academic Values 
in Sponsored Research, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1363, 1363 (1988) (contending· that academic 
truth seeking is compromised by corporate and government funding of research) . 
7
& Before postmodernism, of course, legal realists argued that constitutional inter-
pretation is inescapably value-laden and, as such, that constitutional analysis would al-
ways be driven by "a particular set of policy preferences that cannot be distinguished 
from the preferences expressed in other political forums." LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & 
MARK V. TuSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF 42 (1996); see also James 0. Freedman, The 
Bully Lectern, HARV. MAG., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 36, 36-37 (discussing some of the ways that 
early twentieth-century college presidents involved themselves in the world of politics). 
Perhaps more significant, many academics who sign letters do so for reasons that have 
nothing to do with post-modernism. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text (de-
tailing some of the reasons, other than agreement with the letters' underlying reason-
ing, why academics signed onto the anti-impeachment letter). 
77 It is true, however, that tax and commercial law scholars (if they inquired) could 
spot substantial deviations between Bork's constitutional views and those of their lib-
eral constitutional law colleagues. For this reason, tax and commercial law scholars 
could place Bork outside of the constitutional mainstream within the academy. But 
the claim of the anti-Bork campaign was that Bork was outside of the constitutional 
mainstream as defined not just by the academy, but as defined by the Supreme Court. 
Here, some expertise about differences between Bork's writings (including his deci-
sions as a D.C. Circuit judge) and Supreme Court decision making would be required. 
More to the point, anti-Bork letter signers would need to be able to explain why it is 
that White House claims that Bork's writings were within the mainstream were incor-
rect. See The White House Report: Information on Judge Bark's Q)lalijications,Judicial &cord 
& Related Subjects, reprinted in 9 CARDozo L. REv. 187, 188 (1987) (describing why Bork 
should be considered in the "mainstream of American jurisprudence"). 
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other. 
This postmodemist dilemma is especially acute in the legal acad-
emy. Compare, for example, the academy's reaction to conflicting ar-
guments over the attainability of truth through legal scholarship. 
When Michael Seidman and Mark Tushnet wrote that it is "apparent 
to everyone [that all constitutional] arguments can [and will] bema-
nipulated to advance the particular policy goal of the advocate who 
makes them," no one rose up to complain.78 In contrast, Paul Car-
rington prompted a near crisis in the academy by arguing that law 
professors should believe that law and legal texts matter.79 
This discomfort with truth-seeking is easily explained. Unlike 
chemistry or psychology, law is not a science.80 Instead, lawyers trans-
late the knowledge, experience, and expertise of other professionals.81 
78 SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 76; at 90. In assessing this claim, Steve 
Calabresi suggested that the cause of the problem was not the unattainability of truth 
but the desire oflegal academics to use their scholarship to advance nonnative objec-
tives. SeeCalabresi, supra note 57, at 266 ("[T]he real explanation for the loss in pres-
tige of constitutional scholarship is that it has become a heavily nonnative body of ad-
vocacy scholarship targeted at the federal courts .... "). 
79 See "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
1 (1985) (reprinting the correspondences among legal academics in response to Paul 
D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34J. LEGAI.EDUC. 222 (1984)). A similar uproar 
was caused by the publication of DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND AIL 
REAsON: 1HE RADICAL AssAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997), a book which 
assails critical race theory and other "outsider scholarship." For representative reviews 
of Farber and Sherry's book, see Kathryn Abrams, How to Have a Culture War, 65 U. 
em. L. REV. 1091, 1126 (1998) {book review) Gudging the work to be "flawed and in-
flammatory"); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Book of Manners: How to Conduct a Conversa-
tion on Race-Standing, Imperial Scholarship, and Beyond, 86 GEO. LJ. 1051, 1054-72 
(1998) (book review) (criticizing the attack by Farber and Sherry on critical race the-
ory and suggesting ways to hold discussions on these issues); and Richard A. Posner, 
The Skin Trade, NEWREPUB., Oct. 13, 1997, at 40,43 (praising the work as "a fine book, 
a work of intelligence and courage that will alter the tenns of debate in academic 
law"). See generally, Symposium, Essays in Response to Beyond All Reason, 83 MINN. L. 
REV. 1589 (1999). 
8() During the late nineteenth century, Christopher Langdell and others sought to 
make law a science through the categorization of decisional law. See C. C. LANGDEIL, A 
SELECTION OF CAsES ON 1HE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi (1871) {"Law, considered as a sci-
ence, consists of certain principles or doctrines."). This effort, of course, proved un-
successful. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 45-46 (1983) 
(describing the practical problems judges and lawyers encountered with Langdell's 
method). 
81 See E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 38, 38 (1985) ("[Law] grows by feeding on ideas from outside, not by inventing 
new ones of its own."). But see Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What 
Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35, 38 (1981) ("[L]aw is a relatively autonomous subject, 
and ..• rights will be best and most reasonably respected if reasoning about them goes 
forward within its special discipline."). 
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Thanks to the adversary system, moreover, partisanship figures 
prominently in that translation. Legal academics then have good rea-
son to see themselves as being in the business of making arguments. 
That is what they were trained to do, and that is what they teach their 
students to do. That their scholarship also would be argumentative 
comes as no surprise.82 The surprise, instead, is that the academic 
ethic is sufficiently strong to provide them with cover for such en-
deavors. 
Whether or not traditional notions of truth exist, academics 
should still understand that pretending to have an expert opinion on 
something they know next to nothing about is a deception. Postmod-
emism helps explain but does not excuse this deceit. Another source 
of this deceit, ironically, is the special place of academics in our con-
stitutional order. Linked to the academics' reputation as truth seek-
ers, academic freedom empowers academics to speak out on public 
issues without sanction. For this reason, academics sometimes see 
themselves as supercitizens, entitled to speak out on issues by virtue of 
their status. 
Membership in the academy, however, has its responsibilities as 
well as its rewards.83 Advocacy for advocacy's sake, while certainly enti-
82 Anthony Kronman, in an effort to combat the confluence of scholarship and 
advocacy, argued that "law teachers have a moral responsibility" to pursue truth in 
their scholarship. Anthony T. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Educa-
tion, 90 YALE LJ. 955, 967 (1981). Otherwise, their students will see all law as advocacy 
"which in turn encourages a cynical carelessness about the truth, thus undermining 
the important good of community." I d. For this very reason, I disagree with Cass Sun-
stein's attempt to portray all legal academics as potential experts on any (law-related) 
subject. Instead, speaking (as a "scholar" or "professor") on a politically hot issue re-
quires particular expertise beyond being a lawyer or law professor. See infra notes 95-96 
and accompanying text (questioning Sunstein 's definition of academic expertise). 
83 One of the responsibilities of the academic, according to Edward Shils, is "the 
obligation not to betray the trust which is given to him when laymen look to him for 
objective knowledge and responsible judgment." SHILS, supra note 17, at 106. This 
traditional view is echoed by the American Association of University Professors 
(AAUP), which argues that academics "should remember that the public may judge his 
profession and his institution by his utterances. Hence he should at all times be accu-
rate, should exercise appropriate restraint, [and] should show respect for the opinion 
of others." ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENuRE: A HANDBOOK OF 1HE AMERICAN 
AssOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 132 (Louis Joughin ed., 1969) (quoting 
American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure, available in American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 1940 Statement of Principles on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments (visited Oct. 26, 1999) 
<http://www.aaup.org/1940stat.htm>). Along the same lines, the AAUP Statement on 
Professors and Political Activity specifies that faculty members "should be free to en-
gage in political activities so far as they are able to do so consistently with their obliga-
tions as teachers and scholars." AMERICAN Ass'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, POUCY 
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tied to constitutional protection, is not entitled to the special protec-
tions of academic freedom. More precisely, the Supreme Court's will-
ingness to treat academic free speech as more important than other 
free speech claims is linked to an academic's fiduciary duty to main-
tain "standard[s] of professional integrity.'.s4 Put another way, aca-
demic freedom is a quid pro quo. On the one hand, it protects aca-
demics from outside political pressures. On the other hand, it is a 
"contingent privilege" justified by an academic's willingness to be held 
accountable at a "professional level for the ethical integrity of his 
work."85 
But do the responsibilities of academic freedom attach to joint let-
ters? Mter all, no one expects that each and every signatory has 
played a hand in the letter's drafting. For similar reasons, it is to be 
expected that many signatories agree with the conclusions but not the 
reasoning of the letters they sign.86 Moreover, with the academy's glit-
terati spearheading these letter-writing campaigns, it is to be expected 
that some signatories (who care that the letter's reasoning be well 
thought out but know nothing about impeachment, gun control, or 
whatever) sign on because they assume that these leading lights would 
not lead them astray.87 Finally, some signatories consider the letter's 
reasoning beside the point. Their signature, instead, is about parti-
sanship and nothing else. Being able to explain why academics (who 
cannot defend the reasoning of these letters) sign these missives does 
not justify this practice. Rather, these letters go out of their way to 
DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 33 (7th ed. 1990). 
114 William Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of 
Civil Liberty, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59, 71 (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed., 
1972); see also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (distinguishing aca-
demic freedom from political expression); Glenn R. Morrow, Academic Freedom, in 1 
1HE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 11iE SOCIAL SCIENCES 4, 6 (David L. Sills ed., 
1968) ("The justification of academic freedom cannot be based merely on the right to 
freedom of thought. . . . The justification of academic freedom must therefore be 
sought in the peculiar character and function of the university scholar."). For an up-
date of Supreme Court academic freedom decisions, see David M. Rabban, A Func-
tional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amend-
ment, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 227 (analyzing recent Supreme 
Court decisions concerning different forms of academic freedom). 
85 Van Alstyne, supra note 84, at 76. In his response, Sunstein claims that I do not 
discuss what academic freedom is for. I respectfully disagree. See supra notes 15-18, 82-
83 and accompanying text (arguing that academic freedom encourages academics to 
think independently and to seek truth). 
86 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (illustrating that signatories do not 
necessarily agree with the texts of the letters they sign). 
87 See supra note 32 (noting that it is easier to sign a letter written by someone you 
admire). 
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make clear that they are sending a professional, not a political, mes-
sage. Writing as "scholars,"88 "historians,"89 "law professors,"90 and 
"teachers of constitutional law,"91 these letters tout the self-described 
academic expertise of their signatories. While it is to be expected that 
the academics signing these letters support the outcomes they advo-
cate, it is not to be expected that many of them cannot defend (and 
may well not support) the letters' reasoning. Indeed, it is the reason-
ing of academics-not the conclusions they reach-which justifies 
academic freedom. It is therefore a perversion of academic freedom 
to treat professional expressions of expert opinion as nothing more 
than a plebiscite of personal preferences. 
Widespread abuses of academic freedom, unfortunately, now 
seem to be a fixture of the modem academy. Most tellingly, academ-
ics are likely to do a poor job of checking their own excesses. Peer re-
view-the mechanism by which the academy polices itself-requires 
an openness to different ways of thinking. But with more than three-
fourths of the legal academy "characteriz[ing] themselves as 'moder-
ately' or 'strongly' liberal or left,"92 there are strong incentives to agree 
with prevailing norms. In part, the hegemony within the academy en-
sures that like-thinking individuals will validate the arguments of other 
like-thinking individuals (no matter how sound or silly they may be).93 
This is especially true among academics who think that power, not 
truth, holds the key to governmental reform. For these individuals, 
what matters most is that the right result is reached. In other words, 
rather than encourage counterspeech, the academy and, with it, peer 
88 Scholars' Statement, supra note 11, at 1712. 
89 Hearings, supra note 6, at 334-39. 
90 Id. at 374-83. 
91 Sunstein, supra note 43. 
92 Merritt, supra note 35, at 780 n.54. 
93 For Pierre Schlag, the sameness of viewpoints and methodologies among legal 
academics explains why law professors all agree that flag burning laws are unconstitu-
tional. But outside the legal academy, say, before an American Legion in Des Moines, 
the "deployment of the scam will probably not work very well." PIERRE SCHLAG, THE 
ENCHANTMENT OF REAsON 35 (1998). Within the academy, moreover, there is a real 
risk of opprobrium for those who do not toe the company line. For example, after 
publishing articles that questioned the efficacy of critical race scholarship and the 
purported arrival of the "Asian American Moment" in legal scholarship, the Harvard 
and Iowa law reviews published symposia filled with condemnatory essays. See generally 
Colloquy, Responses to Rllndall Kennedy~ Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103 HARv. 
L. REv. 1844 (1990); Colloquy, 81 IOWAL. REv. 1467 (1996). I must confess that, as I 
write these words, I feel the pressure of nonconformity bearing down on me. By taking 
to task a significant chunk of the legal academy for their behavior in advancing (within 
the academy) politically popular causes, I too may find myself in a hornets' nest. 
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review may well impose "sharp limits on the range of respectable opin-
ion within its ranks. "94 
* * 
What does it mean to speak as an academic expert? Is it enough, 
as defenders of the anti-impeachment letter argue, that an academic 
"believed that they knew enough" by speaking with other academics 
who "probably believed that they knew enough ... ?"95 If this is true, 
every law professor can speak as an expert on any issue. Take the re-
cent Microsoft antitrust case. Based on my watching of television 
news, my conversations with colleagues, and my fuzzy (almost two 
decades old) recollection of an antitrust class, I might believe that I 
know enough to develop "genuine, if fairly general, views"96 on the le-
gality of Microsoft's practices. Ditto the decisions of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, and the National Labor Relations 
Board. According to this view, by reading the newspaper and hanging 
out in the faculty lounge, I can hold myself out as an expert on all 
these things. 
- This recalibration of what it means to be an academic expert 
comes at a price. Over time, the academic ethic may give way to the 
view that self-interest and partisanship are the coins of the academic 
realm. Consexvative critics of the academy have worked hard at por-
traying it "as a taxpayer-financed bunker inhabited by an army of 
Birkenstock-shod Marxists. "97 And these critics have achieved more 
than a modicum of success. A recent crop of books (including Illiberal 
Education,98 The Closing of the American Mind,99 Impostors in the Temple,100 
9< GEORGEj. STIGLER, THE lNTEU.ECIUALAND THE MARKETPLACE 68 (enlarged ed. 
1984). For this reason, Stigler argues that academic freedom must look "inward," so 
that the academy is protected from its own corrupting influences as well as those of 
outsiders. See also Arthur 0. Lovejoy, Academic Freedmn, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 384 (Edwin R. A. Seligman ed., 1930) (stating that academic freedom 
is "rendered impossible if the work of the investigator is shackled by the requirement 
that his conclusions" conform to prevailing norms); David M. Rabban, Does Academic 
Freedom Limit Facv.Uy Autonomy?, 66 TEx. L REv. 1405, 1407..08 (1988) (arguing that 
peer review should limit faculty autonomy). 
95 Sunstein, supra note 27, at text accompanying note 13. 
96 /d. at text accompanying notes 12-13. 
rn Suarez, supra note 3, at BS. 
98 DINESH D'SOUZA, lLuBERAL EDUCATION: 1HE POllTICS OF RACE AND SEX ON 
CAMPus (1991). 
99 
.ALAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING oF THE AMERICAN MIND: How HIGHER EDUCATION 
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Telling the Truth, 101 and ProJScam102) have argued that political correct-
ness, like-minded thinking, and intolerance have corrupted the aca-
demic ethic. Columnists David Broder and Nat Hentoff, as well as 
Judge Richard Posner, condemned the impeachment letter-writing 
campaign for this very reason.103 Whether this criticism will undercut 
the saliency of future letter-writing campaigns remains to be seen. 
Nevertheless, the academy has good reason to fear the perception that 
it is filled with citizen partisans, not citizen scholars. Not only will 
academic freedom suffer a body blow, professors will be handicapped 
in their efforts to affect public discourse through their scholarship.104 
Aside from becoming irrelevant, the academy runs another risk. 
Over the past few years, social conservatives have urged donors and 
university trustees to play more active roles in the life of the academy. 
Among other things, trustees and donors have been urged to combat 
political correctness and moral relativism.105 And some trustees and 
donors are listening to this message. At Virginia's George Mason Uni-
versity, for example, faculty have castigated the school's board of trus-
tees for trying to impose a conservative political agenda. Specifically, 
by shifting funds to programs with a conservative reputation and by 
dissolving a nontraditional educational program, these trustees (all 
HAs FAILED DEMOCRACY AND IMPOVERISHED THE SOULS OF TO DAY'S STUDENTS (1987). 
100 MARTIN ANDERSON, IMPOSTORS IN THE TEMPLE (1992). 
101 LYNNE V. CHENEY, 'TELUNG THE TRUTH: WHY OUR CULTURE AND OUR COUNTRY 
HAVE STOPPED MAKING SENSE-AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (1995). 
102 CHARLEs J. SYKEs, PROFSCAM: PROFESSORS AND THE DEMISE OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION (1988). . 
103 See Posner, supra note 30, at 240-42 (likening the law professors' campaign to "a 
form of herd behavior"); DavidS. Broder, The Historians' Complaint, WASH. POST, Nov. 
1, 1998, at C7 (arguing that some activist academics, including organizers of the histo-
rians' letter, risk looking "ridiculous" by "heedlessly" plunging into political debate); 
Nat Hentoff, Breeding Contempt for the Law, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1998, at A21 (depict-
ing the signers of the historians' letter as a "herd" who employed "embarrassingly con-
torted reasoning"). 
104 For those who see elitist discourse as harmful to the commonwealth, of course, 
this changing image of the academy will be salutory. See BORK, supra note 52, at 337 
(arguing that the public explosion at Bork's nomination was driven by liberals at issue 
with a more conservative general public); NAGEL, supra note 51, at 27-43 (arguing that 
the legal culture is properly concerned with ideas, but the political culture is con-
cerned with the consequences of ideas, as seen within the Bork Supreme Court nomi-
nation hearings); SCHLAG, supra note 93, at 35-38 (arguing that legal thinkers tend to 
be almost entirely center-left democrats and it is not surprising when they all agree). 
105 See ANDERSON, supra note 100, at 194-206 (arguing that university trustees sel-
dom use their potential power and leadership effectively); NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR 
THE HUMANITIES, 'TELUNG THE TRUTH 49-51 (1992) (arguing that although trustees of 
universities seldom use their authority to exercise leadership, they should exert more 
influence on colleges and universities). 
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but one of whom were appointed by conservative Republican gover-
nors) have broken ranks with university administrators.106 Will other 
trustees follow George Mason's lead? Perhaps not. But the more p<:>-
litical the academy is perceived, the more likely it_is that governors will 
appoint political trustees. 
It may be that this is the fate the academy deserves. Mter all, the 
partisanship and misdirection of some academic letter-writing cam-
paigns contradicts some of the most basic tenets of academic freedom. 
More fundamentally, the willingness of so many academics to pawn off 
fake knowledge suggests that the conditions supporting academic 
freedom have dissipated. Among other things, it is difficult to square 
academic freedom with ideological conformity, the advent of post-
modernism, the rise of sound bite scholarship, and, especially at law 
schools, the nexus between celebrity status and partisanship. What is 
truly amazing here is that the academy is risking so much to accom-
plish so little. In the cases of Bork and impeachment, for example, 
the battle lines were drawn before the academics entered the fray. 
More than anything, the academic participants in these wars were 
stage props-brought into the drama to demonstrate that politicians 
take the Constitution seriously. 
What then can the academy do to rescue itself? To start, academ-
ics ought not to remove themselves from the world of politics. The 
very reason that academics possess tenure, academic freedom, and the 
like is so they may speak "truth to power. "107 Academics, however, 
must be cautious in their utterances. It is not enough, for example, 
that some of their colleagues might "indulge a principle of charity" 
that would allow them to express an expert opinion without toiling 
with research, writing, and the like.108 The price of academic freedom 
is that scholars must use reason, thought, and care in defending their 
positions, whether political or not. Devices that allow academics to 
register positions without doing the necessary work undermine aca-
demic freedom for all. When it comes to letter writing, for example, 
academics should only sign letters that they could (if asked to) defend 
in public.109 Beyond letter writing, academics should embrace both 
106 See Victoria Benning, Facully, Board Clash at George Mason, WASH. POST, May 21, 
1999, at B1 (reporting that the George Mason University faculty is battling with the 
university trustees over the trustees' conservative political agenda). 
107 Schlesinger, supra note 14, at 28. Moreover, with the Supreme Court signaling 
its disinclination to reshape society through sweeping judicial edicts, it is sensible that 
legal academics would pay more attention to elected government reforms. 
108 Sunstein, supra note 27, at text accompanying note 24. 
109 In his response, Sunstein claims that he "emphatically" agrees with me that 
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ideological diversity and dialectic reasoning (where each thesis is chal-
lenged by a counter-thesis).uo That way the academy can better live 
up to its marketplace-of-ideas reputation. 
Politically motivated academics must come to grips with a grim re-
ality, that "[i]n a world where there are no rules of scholarship or 
journalism or evidence, where everything is opinion and all opinions 
are alike, the market wins. "111 That market, of course, is far more con-
servative than the academy. For this very reason, politically motivated 
academics should see academic freedom as a bunker from which to 
fight battles, not as a relic of times past. But to preserve academic 
freedom, politically motivated academics must honor it, not abuse it. 
For their part, academics who steer clear of partisan causes--that is, 
most academics-must hold their politically active colleagues ac-
countable for abusing academic freedom. Othenvise, they too will pay 
the price of membership in a once-revered profession increasingly 
h ld . d' ll2 e m 1srepute. 
"academics should not sign letters that they could not defend publicly." Sunstein, su-
pra note 27, at text accompanying note 32. For Sunstein, however, it is not necessary 
that they could defend these positions as academics--i.e., defend the substance of the 
letter with a commanding knowledge of the relevant sources. See supra notes 94-96, 
108 and accompanying text (discussing what it means to be an academic expert). 
110 One way of encouraging such diversity, of course, is to hire professors 
who--because of academic training or ideology-see the world differently from one 
another. At the least, academics should share their work (in draft) with individuals 
who may well disagree with them. For this reason, the screening out of likely naysayers 
from letter writers' distribution lists is inappropriate. See supra notes 42, 49 and ac-
companying text (suggesting that organizers of the anti-Bork and anti-impeachment 
letters did not circulate those letters to likely naysayers). 
m Mary Schweitzer, Letter to the Editor, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 17, 1998, at 
B3. 
112 For this very reason, the academics who suffer the greatest harm from purely 
political letter-writing campaigns are those who only sign letters on subjects on which 
they are experts (and organizers of mass letters who limit signatories to individuals 
who have subject matter expertise). 
